We investigate stock returns, market quality, and options market activity around the flash crash of May 6, 2010. Abnormal returns are negative on the day of and the day after the flash crash for stocks that had trades that executed during the crash subsequently cancelled by either Nasdaq or NYSE Arca. Consistent with studies that suggest that other sources of liquidity withdrew from the markets during the flash crash, we find that the fraction of trades executed by the NYSE increases during this volatile period. Market quality deteriorates following the flash crash as bidask spreads increase and quote depths decrease. Evidence from the options markets indicates that investor uncertainty increased around the time of the crash and remained elevated for several days afterwards.
conventions among various exchanges; stub quotes; and market and limit orders. 1 The report places particular emphasis on the impact of an unusually large sell order in E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts. Academic studies of the flash crash tend to focus on the role of high frequency traders. While stopping short of blaming high frequency traders directly, Easley et al. (2011) and Kirilenko et al. (2011) conclude that they did contribute to the extreme market volatility witnessed on the day of the crash. Lee et al. (2011) suggest that the flash crash resulted from systematic traders with similar trading strategies, while Yu (2011) finds evidence that contrarian trading strategies helped to mitigate the effects of the flash crash.
We contribute to the search for answers by studying NYSE-listed stocks that had trades executed during the flash crash that were subsequently cancelled by either Nasdaq or NYSE Arca and a closely matched sample of stocks that did not experience cancelled trades. The focus of our analysis is fourfold. First, we examine stock returns around the flash crash. Second, we provide details on the allocation of trading volume across trading venues during this period of extreme volatility. Third, we examine market quality before, during, and after the flash crash, including measures of bid-ask spreads and quote depth. Fourth, for sample stocks with tradable options, we study changes to the sensitivity of option prices to quantifiable risk factors around the flash crash.
We find that shareholder wealth declined significantly in the days surrounding the flash crash. The average cumulative abnormal return over the two days beginning on the day of the flash crash is -1.77 percent for stocks that had trades that executed on May 6, 2010 that were subsequently cancelled. During the flash crash, several of our sample stocks had trades execute at stub quotes (e.g., $0.01 or $100,000), which indicates that the limit order book was very thin, particularly on the bid side. 2 One possibility is that these trades may have accelerated price discovery and contributed to the observed price declines.
3 Deteriorating market quality also may have been a contributing factor, as prior research finds that liquidity and stock returns are positively correlated (see, for example, Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) . However, we find that returns are not significantly different from zero over the same period for a closely matched sample of stocks that did not have cancelled trades, despite the fact that these stocks also experienced a negative, albeit less severe, liquidity shock around the flash crash.
Consistent with prior studies that suggest that other sources of liquidity withdrew during the flash crash, we find that the fraction of trades executed on the NYSE increased significantly on the day of the crash. We find that bid-ask spreads increased and quote depth decreased in the wake of the flash crash for both the base and matched sample stocks, although the effects are more pronounced for stocks with cancelled trades. While it is difficult to attribute the deterioration in market quality directly to the flash crash, such events have the potential to negatively affect investor confidence, stock market participation, and liquidity.
Contemporaneous events are also likely to have contributed to investor uncertainty during this period. For example, the CFTC-SEC (2010) report notes that premiums on credit default swaps increased for a number of European sovereign debt securities and the Euro fell in global currency markets on May 6, 2010. Increased investor uncertainly is also evident in the options markets.
We find that implied volatility increased dramatically and the sensitivity of option prices to changes in the underlying stock prices (gamma) and implied volatility (vega) were noticeably different following the flash crash.
Whereas prior studies of the flash crash tend to focus on exchange traded funds that track broad stock market indices, ours is one of the first to examine individual stocks impacted by the crash. 4 This approach makes it possible to measure changes in shareholder wealth and the underlying market quality of stocks in the days surrounding the flash crash. We find that the shareholder wealth, market quality, and option market effects are perceptible well beyond May 6, 2010. These effects are not only apparent for stocks that were singled out for trade cancellations by the exchanges, but also for matched samples that did not experience cancelled trades.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our sample and methodology. We report our empirical findings in Section 3 and conclude in Section 4.
Sample selection
Our base sample consists of the common stocks of 29 NYSE-listed firms incorporated in the 
We report the stocks contained in both the base and matched samples in Table 1 .
<<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>>
In Wilcoxon rank sum tests indicate that the only significant difference in the medians of the base and matched samples is for the market capitalization measure.
<<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>>

Empirical results
Abnormal returns
We begin our analysis with an examination of stock returns around the flash crash. Our benchmark for measuring abnormal returns is the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model augmented by Carhart"s (1997) momentum factor. 6 The model is:
where R jt is the return on the j th stock on day t, R mt is the return on the market index on day t, SMB t is the average return on small-firm stocks minus the average return on large-firm stocks on day t, HML t is the average return on high book-to-market stocks minus the average return on low book-to-market stocks on day t, and UMD t is the average return on high prior return portfolios minus the average return on low prior return portfolios. β j , s j , h j , and u j measure a stock"s sensitivity to the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors, respectively.
Daily abnormal returns are measured for common stock j on day t as: In Table 3 , we report the results of our abnormal return analysis. We report mean abnormal returns and the percentage of returns greater than zero for both the base and matched samples for the 11 trading days centered on the day of the flash crash. At the bottom of Table 3 we report cumulative abnormal returns over three windows beginning on the event day. On the day of the flash crash, the abnormal return for the typical base sample stock is -0.80 percent. Over the window [0, +1], the mean cumulative abnormal return is -1.77 percent. The majority of the base sample stocks experience non-positive abnormal returns both on the day of the flash crash (72 percent) and over the two day window beginning on the day of the flash crash (82 percent).
Returns for the matched sample are not significantly different from zero over the same period.
<<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>>
These results show that the flash crash was accompanied by a significant decline in shareholder wealth, particularly for stocks that subsequently had trades cancelled. The decline in shareholder wealth is consistent with a number of possible explanations. During the flash crash, several of the base sample stocks had trades execute at stub quotes (e.g., $0.01), which indicates that the limit order book was very thin on the bid side. One possibility is that market participants updated their views about these stocks" true value based on this information, leading to the observed price declines. We are not the first to propose that the limit order book played a role in the flash crash. For instance, Madhavan (2012) conjectures that market fragmentation contributed to the flash crash, in part, by thinning out limit order books. McInish et al. (2012) find evidence that intermarket sweep orders may have destabilized the market by depleting the limit order book.
Another possibility is that the price declines resulted from negative shocks to liquidity, which Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find is positively correlated with stock returns. We report evidence that liquidity deteriorated around the flash crash in subsequent tests. However, despite our finding that returns are not significantly different from zero for the matched sample, we find that market quality deteriorated for both samples around the flash crash. Before turning to market quality and the options markets, we continue with a brief look at trade execution before, during, and after the flash crash.
Trade execution
Whereas high frequency traders are often a significant source of liquidity in the financial markets, Kirilenko et al. (2011) conclude that high frequency traders" behavior on the day of the flash crash exacerbated market volatility. Consistent with this notion, the CFTC-SEC (2010) report on the flash crash finds evidence that some high frequency traders aggressively sold shares during the crash, while others scaled back or stopped trading altogether. An obvious question arises. Who stepped into the void left when other sources of liquidity moved to the sidelines?
The importance of dedicated market makers has been debated for decades. Garbade and Silber (1979) and Grossman and Miller (1988) highlight the advantages of having a market maker obligated to maintain a market. More recent studies by Glosten (1994) and Bloomfield et al. (2005) suggest, however, that market structure is likely to evolve in favor of public liquidity providers. In Figs. 2a and 2b, we provide evidence that the importance of NYSE designated market makers increased during the flash crash.
<<FIG. 2 ABOUT HERE>>
In Fig positioners. This is consistent with the notion that OTC market makers, who typically internalize a large portion of the order flow, instead chose to route orders to the exchanges.
<<FIG. 3 ABOUT HERE>>
The dramatic increase in the number of trades executed on May 6, 2010 highlighted in Figs. 4a and 4b, underscores the importance of the NYSE during this period of market instability. (2010) research, is that NYSE quotes lagged other markets during the flash crash, which allowed arbitrageurs to profit at the expense of the NYSE and drove trading volume to the exchange.
In Fig. 5 , we report evidence consistent with Nanex"s (2010) contention that delays in quote dissemination increased seller-initiated volume on the NYSE. We use trade direction indicators constructed using a combination of the tick-and quote-test methodology (Lee and Ready, 1991) and find that the percentage of seller-initiated trades spiked on the NYSE in advance of the flash crash and remained at elevated levels through the end of the trading day. However, neither explanation (high frequency traders, arbitrage trading) accounts for the sustained increase in trades captured by the NYSE in the days following the flash crash. Not only do we find that the NYSE executed a greater portion of trades during the flash crash, but also for several days afterwards.
<<FIG. 5 ABOUT HERE>>
Market quality
In this section, we examine market quality measures for signs that liquidity deteriorated in the days and weeks surrounding the flash crash. The primary measure of transaction costs in the microstructure literature is the bid-ask spread, which refers to the difference in the prices that a supplier of immediacy stands ready to buy and sell a security. Demsetz (1968) suggests that the bid-ask spread provides compensation to dealers for providing liquidity. We calculate three spread-based measures that are commonly used in the literature. The first is the absolute spread, which is calculated as follows:
where A it and B it represent the ask and bid for security i at time t, respectively.
The second measure is the quoted spread, which is calculated as follows:
where P it represents the trade price for security i at time t. Determinants of the quoted spread include order handling costs (Tinic, 1972) , inventory risk (Stoll, 1978) , and adverse selection (Copeland and Galai, 1983) . Lee (1993) finds that trades often occur at a price inside or outside the bid and ask quotes.
The third measure, the effective spread, reflects this possibility and represents an estimate of the true execution cost for a trader. Following Lee, the effective spread is calculated as follows:
where S it is the trade direction indicator set equal to +1 (-1) for buy (sell) orders and M it is the quote midpoint calculated as the average of the ask and bid prices. Lee et al. (1993) suggest that market makers who are subject to adverse selection can both increase spreads and reduce depth, where depth refers to the number of shares a market maker is willing to trade at the prevailing bid and ask quotes. Thus, we consider quote depth as an additional measure of market quality. We measure quote depth as the average depth at the prevailing National Best Bid and Offer bid and ask quotes.
Quote depth = (Depth bid + Depth ask )/2,
In Table 4 , we report the market quality measures for the base sample (Panel A) and matched sample (Panel B) from one day before through one day after the flash crash (May 5 -May 7, 2010). In addition to the measures discussed above, we report turnover (the daily number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding), volume (number of shares traded across all exchanges), and the percentage of trades executed on the NYSE. Because we are interested in market quality changes that anticipate and/or linger beyond the flash crash, we restrict our analysis to between 9:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. to avoid contaminating the results with potentially temporary market quality changes that occurred during the flash crash. 8 Both panels report daily mean values and day-to-day differences.
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In Table 4 , Panel A, we find that spreads widened and depth decreased around the flash crash for base sample stocks. The spread measures indicate that trading costs were significantly higher the day after the flash crash compared to prior days. For example, the average quoted spread for the base sample is over 44 percent higher on In Table 4 , Panel B, we report a similar deterioration in market quality for the matched sample. As is the case for the base sample, the matched sample stocks exhibit wider spreads and lower depths following the flash crash. This suggests that the market quality deterioration around the flash crash was not limited to the stocks that had trades cancelled. 10 In Panel C, we report differences between the base and matched sample for each day. Day-to-day differences in spreads, while not significant on the day prior to the flash crash, increase and become significant on the day of and the day after the flash crash. This indicates that the worsening of liquidity was more pronounced for stocks with cancelled trades.
In Table 5 , we report OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the change in spreads from May 5 through May 7, 2010. Base sample is an indicator variable set equal to 1 for stocks that had a trade executed on May 6, 2010 that was subsequently cancelled by the Nasdaq or NYSE Arca and zero for matched sample stocks. Additional control variables include day-to-day changes in intraday volatility, turnover, and price (price inverse). We also interact the indicator variable with each of the control variables to capture their marginal effects for base sample stocks.
<<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE>>
The first three columns of Table 5 report changes in absolute, quoted, and effective spreads, respectively, from May 5 to May 6, 2010 (Event / Pre-Event). The results indicate that changes in intraday volatility had a significant impact on absolute spreads, but only for the base sample stocks. Recall from Table 4 that spreads increased significantly for both the base and matched samples following the flash crash. The middle (last) three columns of Table 5 examine changes in spreads from May 6 -May 7, 2010 (May 5 -May 7, 2010). We find some evidence that the 10 In unreported tests, we examine market quality changes for (i) a random control sample, (ii) a matched sample that excludes the S&P 500 index match criteria, and (iii) a matched sample based on March, 2010 market capitalization, share price, average daily turnover, and return volatility. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 4-7 and support the notion that the deterioration in market quality around the flash crash extended beyond the stocks that had trades cancelled.
increase in quoted spreads following the crash is negatively correlated with changes in turnover, but this effect is concentrated in matched sample stocks.
In Table 6 , we examine market quality over a two- we report a similar deterioration in market quality for the matched sample. In Panel C, we find that the market quality measures exhibit few significant differences between the two samples both before and after the flash crash.
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In Table 7 , we report OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the change in absolute, quoted, and effective spreads from the two weeks before the flash crash (April 22 - 
<<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE>>
Overall, our analysis indicates that the deterioration in market quality around the flash crash extended to stocks beyond those with cancelled trades. This deterioration is observable well beyond May 6, 2010 as bid-ask spreads are higher and quote depth is lower in the two weeks following the flash crash compared to the two weeks prior to the flash crash for both the base and matched samples. The multivariate results suggest that trading volume (turnover) and volatility were primary determinants of the higher spreads. Contemporaneous events make it difficult to attribute the deterioration in market quality solely to the flash crash. For instance, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe was also likely to have contributed to investor uncertainty (see, for example, CFTC-SEC, 2010). However, events like the flash crash have the potential to negatively affect investor confidence, stock market participation, and liquidity.
Options markets
The CFTC-SEC (2010) report indicates that, while the disruptions in the options markets were not as severe as those in the equities markets, some options market makers did respond to the day"s volatility by widening quotes, reducing depth, and/or withdrawing from the market entirely. In Table 8 , we report additional evidence on the options markets around May 6, 2010.
We calculate implied volatility, delta, gamma, and vega using option price data from
OptionMetrics for the 11 trading days centered on the day of the flash crash, where delta measures the sensitivity of an option's value to changes in the underlying stock price, gamma measures the sensitivity of an option's delta to changes in the stock price, and vega measures the sensitivity of an option's value to changes in the implied volatility. All calculations use historical LIBOR/Eurodollar rates for interest rate inputs, and correctly incorporate discrete dividend payments. Variables are calculated using at-the-money forward call options with 30 days to expiration.
<<TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE>>
Our analysis of the options markets supports the notion that uncertainty dramatically increased around the flash crash. We find that implied volatility spiked on the day of the flash crash. For example, for base sample stocks with tradable options, the average implied volatility increased from 0.360 to 0.462 from May 5 to May 6, 2010. This represents a statistically significant increase of 28.33 percent. We also report a less pronounced, albeit significant, increase in implied volatility for the matched sample. While the average delta was unchanged, we find that both gamma and vega changed significantly during the flash crash. The decrease in gamma suggests that option prices became less sensitive to changes in the underlying stock prices on the day of the flash crash. The increase in vega suggests that that option prices became more sensitive to changes in implied volatility around the flash crash. Overall, the results indicate that derivatives traders" volatility estimates increased around the flash crash.
Conclusion
The flash crash lasted only a short time, but it left an indelible mark on financial markets.
The crash has already affected regulatory policy, as the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission recently approved trading pauses for individual stocks that experience a price movement of 10 percent or more over a five-minute period. 12 Regulators, researchers, and other market participants continue to seek explanations for the day"s events. We contribute to the search for answers by studying stock returns, market quality, and options market activity around the flash crash.
We find that shareholder wealth declined for stocks that had trades that executed on May 6, 2010 that were subsequently cancelled by either Nasdaq or NYSE Arca. We find that the fraction of trades executed on the NYSE increased dramatically during the flash crash and that market quality deteriorated, as bid-ask spreads increased and quote depths decreased. We also report significant changes in the derivatives markets as implied volatility increased, and option values became less (more) sensitive to changes in the underlying stock prices (implied volatility). These effects were not limited to stocks with cancelled trades but are also evident for a closely matched sample of stocks without trade cancellations. While it is difficult to attribute all of the results that we document strictly to the flash crash, such events have the potential to negatively impact investor confidence and destabilize financial markets. base sample and matched sample stocks used in this study. The base sample consists of the stocks of 29 NYSE-listed firms incorporated in the U.S. that had trades executed on May 6, 2010 and subsequently cancelled by either Nasdaq or NYSE Arca. Nasdaq and NYSE Arca cancelled all trades that occurred between 2:40 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. that executed at a price that was 60 percent greater or lower than the last trade that took place at 2:40 p.m. (or immediately prior). We match each base sample stock with a matching stock that did not have trades cancelled, on the basis of market capitalization, share price, daily turnover, and return volatility. Base sample stocks that are part of the S&P 500 index as of April 1, 2010 are matched with other S&P 500 components. Fama-French (1993) three-factor model augmented by Carhart"s (1997) momentum factor, for the stocks in base sample and the matched sample for the 11-trading days centered on May 6, 2010. % positive represents the fraction of returns that are greater than zero. The significance of the fraction of positive returns is assessed using a sign test. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are also reported for 6-, 4-, and 2-day windows beginning on May 6, 2010. Difference represents the difference in average returns between the base sample and the matched sample. Significance of the abnormal return is assessed using a t-test and the difference in means is assessed using a paired t-test. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level. B) reports this data for the stocks in the base sample (matched sample). Absolute spread represents the ask price minus the bid price for a stock. Quoted spread is the difference between bid and ask price (ask price -bid price) of a stock expressed as a percentage of the trade price. Effective spread is calculated as 2 x S it x (P it -M it )/M it x 100; where S it is the trade direction indicator set equal to +1 for buy orders and -1 for sell orders, constructed using a combination of the tick-test and quote-test methodology as recommended by Lee and Ready (1991) and M it is the quote midpoint calculated as the ask price plus the bid price, divided by two. Quote depth represents the average depth at the prevailing National Best Bid and Offer bid and ask quotes. Turnover is the daily number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding (in percent). Volume measures average trading volume across all exchanges. Trades executed on the NYSE is the average number of trades executed on the NYSE relative to the number of trades executed on all U.S exchanges (in percent). Differences between corresponding days are also reported. Panel C reports the difference in the corresponding measures between the base sample and the matched sample for each day. Significance of difference in values is assessed using paired t-test.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level. to May 7, 2010 (Post-Event / Event), and May 5 to May 7, 2010 (Post-Event / Pre-Event). Absolute spread represents the ask price minus the bid price for a stock. Quoted spread is the difference between bid and ask price (ask price -bid price) of a stock expressed as a percentage of the trade price. Effective spread is calculated as 2 x S it x (P it -M it )/M it x 100; where S it is the trade direction indicator set equal to +1 for buy orders and -1 for sell orders, constructed using a combination of the tick-test and quote-test methodology as recommended by Lee and Ready (1991) and M it is the quote midpoint calculated as the ask price plus the bid price, divided by two. Base sample is an indicator set equal to 1 for stocks that had trades that executed on May 6, 2010 that were subsequently cancelled by the Nasdaq or NYSE Arca and zero for matched sample stocks. Intraday volatility is the standard deviation of open-to-close mid-quote returns, measured over 20-minute intervals. Turnover is the ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding. Inverse price is the ratio of 1 to the stock price. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level. of changes in spreads for the base sample and matched sample from the two weeks preceding the flash crash (April 22 -May 5) through two weeks following the flash crash (May 7 -May 20). Absolute spread represents the ask price minus the bid price for a stock. Quoted spread is the difference between bid and ask price (ask price -bid price) of a stock expressed as a percentage of the trade price. Effective spread is calculated as 2 x S it x (P it -M it )/M it x 100; where S it is the trade direction indicator set equal to +1 for buy orders and -1 for sell orders, constructed using a combination of the tick-test and quote-test methodology as recommended by Lee and Ready (1991) and M it is the quote midpoint calculated as the ask price plus the bid price, divided by two. Base sample is an indicator set equal to 1 for stocks that had trades that executed on May 6, 2010 that were subsequently cancelled by the Nasdaq or NYSE Arca and zero for matched sample stocks. Intraday volatility is the standard deviation of open-to-close mid-quote returns, measured over 20-minute intervals. Turnover is the ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding. Inverse price is the ratio of 1 to the stock price. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
